On 9/11/12, grarpamp <grarp...@gmail.com> wrote: >> If anonAccountA and anonAccountB are run by different users, I'd >> expect them to use the same exit 1/N of the times that they both log >> in. >> >> But if, over time, I see that anonAccountA and anonAccountB both >> sometimes use some of the same exits, but they never use the same exit >> at the same time, I can conclude that they are run by the same user, > > Yes I see that analysis clear for the pure anon account, 1/N, situation :) > > It seemed that with some non pure anon parameters/patterns that > isolating exit might be better than using the 1/N odds. Currently Tor > exit is also not near to 1/N selection odds.
This makes choosing each circuit's exit node independently even more important. > If I am jane.red1@, jane.red2@, and jane.red3@, all with Mac browser > at 04:00hr via a smaller curve set of exit IP's... it may be an easier > guess Jane Red is hosed regardless of her exit-node distribution: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/papers/pets2011/p1-perito.pdf > than if I am jeff4@ with Mac, greenshoes@ with Win, and sophie@ with > BSD at tea time via 1/N with the "not at the same time" behavior. > *At least for the casual log observer. Which (popular) sites are thought > to be casual vs. statistical observers is also to consider in choice of > defense style. The casual log observer will see that all three have, at some time, connected from IP addresses whose reverse-DNS strings contain “tor”, and decide based on that that they are all the same person. And if you cause them any trouble, they may hand their logs over to a statistical log observer. > Also, maybe Tor has cases for fuzzy logic. This sentence seems about as relevant to the rest of your message as a fruit bat. Robert Ransom _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
