----- Forwarded message from Michael Rogers <[email protected]> -----
From: Michael Rogers <[email protected]> Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2012 14:45:21 +0100 To: [email protected], Tahoe-LAFS development <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [tahoe-dev] switching from introducers to gossip? User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:13.0) Gecko/20120614 Thunderbird/13.0.1 Reply-To: Tahoe-LAFS development <[email protected]> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 11/07/12 14:02, James A. Donald wrote: >> It seems people are only aware of the last feature because of >> the poorly chosen name. IMO, the "hidden" aspect is one of the >> less interesting features. I've heard a rumor that there's a >> proposal to make a version of this feature which provides the >> other features without the hidden part for the benefit of lower >> latency. > > This would be extremely convenient, for unhidden tor services could > not only provide lower latency, but could handle high bandwidth. I think it might be possible to handle this from the client side by building circuits with fewer than three hops. If I remember right, hidden services work something like this: * Alice, a client running a hidden service, chooses several introduction points and builds a circuit to each one * Alice anonymously publishes the addresses of the introduction points * Bob, a client wishing to contact Alice's hidden service, anonymously retrieves the addresses of the introduction points * Bob chooses a rendezvous point and builds a circuit to it * Bob builds a circuit to one of Alice's introduction points and informs Alice of the rendezvous point * If Alice accepts the connection, she builds a circuit to Bob's rendezvous point, which connects Alice's circuit to Bob's circuit * Alice and Bob communicate through the connected circuits Usually each circuit has three hops, but if Alice and Bob don't need to be anonymous or unlinkable they can use one-hop circuits. The final connection would have two hops: Alice <-> rendezvous point <-> Bob. The client is responsible for choosing the length of the circuit in Tor, so it should be possible to do this through a client library like Silvertunnel without modifying the protocol or the relays. Cheers, Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJP/YNxAAoJEBEET9GfxSfMIWMH/RabIuZ362zznSbpvkzx5CBW ZWH3yxEVY9IbgeeY6dV/IP65ZVfrQa4caPXohbG8HbJj7XJp/ijnan15Z0TtkN2j 0ze9TSTZoU0Nk9KWfARBZ1Qdq3e7/Ui+RWNipjl+wjZtq4FVsmJ95hdqrUjKaNwK 3LKVTaXAIbjcgWFWCZ+Tqm/7NxN4SlssG2ewNvnd77TKzMMoRO9wOc5jaBxfxdFY q3co0mFndh4l3lRw23m/MNJC/MWbyKysG5OhkjVRmQ/cI4klSKBiF2dJwOS3flNC +5y8ry1vzo/ltG2Tkpa2fZE1a+uu9OuH9/PPCRcGJH15krTtZKNoVq/60EltaEA= =oKrm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list [email protected] https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org";>leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
