Il 21 febbraio 2012 09:09, Andrew Lewman <and...@torproject.org> ha scritto: > On Mon, 20 Feb 2012 16:15:37 +0800 > Koh Choon Lin <2choon...@gmail.com> wrote: >> "The authorities in Singapore are understood to have the ability to >> track down a person online even if he or she uses anonymizing >> facilities such as Virtual Private Networking, TOR onion routing, or >> other forms of proxy servers, and even if encryption is involved. This >> is because all internet traffic in Singapore is directed through a >> common proxy choke with date, time and IP stamping operation in >> place." > > It's plausible they record all transit through their single internet > connection to non-Singapore world. Here are my thoughts, sort of based > on https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#Torisdifferent faq > answer. > > This collected information could give them tor clients talking to the > public list of tor relays or known tor bridges. > > They have deployed a DPI device that can recognize the tor handshake > and are recording the tor client to relay handshake. > > In both of these cases, they can only identify that you may be using > tor, not what you're doing. > > Using obfsproxy could defeat both of the above issues. >
Paranoid mode: on They intercept the initial bootstrapping and make you connect to a "fake" tor network composed of malicious nodes only. Is it feasible? _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
