On 10.10.2011 22:29, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote: > No code coming from the web would be allowed to interact with the > plug-in but the end-user will still have all the encryption features > under his power, usable in a modern web-based world.
The problem Robert and katmagic are referring to (read access to the DOM) can only be mitigated by disabling active scripting on the pages where GPG is used. The plugin probably would have to notify the user, then disable all scripting and reload the page, before executing GPG functionality. This does not help against the "read plaintext before encryption" attack, obviously. At the moment, I cannot think of any attack vectors once you combine it with enabled Torbutton (or a stripped down Tor Browser) where active scripting/access to the DOM is disabled completely. -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/ _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
