Thanks Robert. I know that there was several attacks with control of both exit and entry node. And I just want to test that attack and evaluate its effectiveness. Regards. 2011/5/11 Robert Ransom <[email protected]>
> On Wed, 11 May 2011 10:11:07 +0200 > NGUYEN Quoc Viet <[email protected]> wrote: > > > I'm now researching an attack against Tor. > > > > *Resume of Attack*: We control exit node and entry node. Upon receiving a > > RELAY BEGIN cell,the exit node will forger a malicious webpage to > client. > > The webpage contains some empty gif files. The entry node will be able to > > detect a distinctive pattern of the connection to that malicious webpage, > > basing on number of relay cells backward and forward. > > If you can control both the entry and exit nodes, you don't even need > to perform an active attack -- a purely passive timing attack will > identify the client. That's why each Tor client selects a few relays > to use as ‘entry guards’ -- see > <https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards> and > <http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hs-attack06>. > > > > For implementation, it's needed to modify a piece of Tor source code at > the > > exit node, to forger a malicious webpage to client. Notice that this is > not > > modifying webpage response from the server, but forger attacker's webpage > to > > the client. Could some one please give a hint about where I need to > modify. > > No. > > > Robert Ransom > > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > > -- Nguyen Quoc Viet
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