Neel, I get the security vs usability considerations between centralized vs decentralized (or in the case of Tor semi-decentralized) networks. However, at a minimum, doesn't it make sense to exclude publishing address information from Tor metrics, etc, as to stop giving censorship organizations a free handout? Force them to invest resources to setup distributed Tor relays to glean addresses asynchronously in the wild. As it stands, all they have to do is write a simple bot to extract the synchronously published data on a daily basis. It seems to be an inherent obstacle in design attempting to anonymize a sub-network within an established known super-network. Thank you for your response. Respectfully,
Gary— This Message Originated by the Sun. iBigBlue 63W Solar Array (~12 Hour Charge) + 2 x Charmast 26800mAh Power Banks = iPhone XS Max 512GB (~2 Weeks Charged) On Thursday, December 23, 2021, 10:14:05 PM PST, Neel Chauhan <n...@neelc.org> wrote: On 2021-12-22 22:42, Gary C. New via tor-relays wrote: > I know it might be a fundamental change to the Tor network, but would > it be possible to obfuscate the Tor bridge/relay addresses with their > respective fingerprints; similar, to the I2P network? I've often > thought that this aspect of the I2P network is one that is implemented > well. Perhaps Directory Authorities could preform fingerprint to > address resolution? I think it would be extremely beneficial if > neither bridge or relay addresses were published in the wild. It would > make great strides in further buffering the Tor network from various > black-listing/censorship techniques. The thing is, while Tor itself is decentralized, the directory authorities and fallback directories are not. For a Tor client to bootstrap, you need a list of relays to be able to connect to. And in turn you have to contact the dirauths or the fallbacks. While you could use an I2P-style or more recently blockchain-style setup, I believe there was a reason for Tor to use centralized dirauths. I can't seem to find the article/FAQ right now, even though I had it a few years ago. I'm guessing it's to prevent malicious dirauths, unlike how Bitcoin could get manipulated by bad actors with a decentralized authority system. > Respectfully, > > Gary -Neel
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