> Clients don't choose relays in the same /16 in the same circuit. > So I don't think this is a danger to users.
Ok. > We would like to write a polite email saying: > "thanks for helping Tor, please add a family to your config". > > But since they haven't provided contact details, we can't do that. > > T > > -- > Tim / teor > > PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B > ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ But as Aneesh pointed out in the other thread: >---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- >Subject: Re: [tor-relays] DoS attacks on multiple relays >From: "Aneesh Dogra" <lionane...@gmail.com> >Date: Tue, December 5, 2017 9:37 am >To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Looks scary. Interesting to see they all have high guard probabilities. :-? My concerns are more about the HS harvesting/correlation capabilities these relays have, than de-anonymisation of users. I am not a Tor specialist, but would like to know if there are any kind of safety measures against such persons/entities employing automated big farms, high speed, stable guards, HSDir, without family set, or proposals being discussed on the topic. cheers. x9p _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
