Okay, So I've found a ISP in Kenya that says they're happy to host a tor exit node. The ping is 270ms from a Canadian ISP, 16 hops. 183ms from Germany, 13 hops.
Ultimately, am I making the tor network better or worse, if I were to set up some tor nodes here? - Chris On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 8:41 AM, Sebastian Hahn <sebast...@torproject.org> wrote: > > > On 09 Dec 2016, at 09:34, teor <teor2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > >> On 8 Dec. 2016, at 22:08, Sec INT <sec.i...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > >> US just has alot of people trying to exit there - so its always busy > > > > Tor clients choose exits at random, based on the ports the exit allows. > > They *do not* try to find an exit close to the site they are going to. > > > >> - I find Tor follows the money mostly - high concentration in W.Europe > and US but drops sharply anywhere else - > > > > All the tor bandwidth-measuring authorities are also located in either > > Western Europe or the US. Relays closer to a bandwidth authority > > (lower network latency) are measured faster than those further away. > > > > This is a side-effect of measuring the delay in transmission inside > > the relay itself. > > > >> On 9 Dec. 2016, at 06:23, Duncan Guthrie <dguth...@posteo.net> wrote: > >> > >> Thus, running relays in Africa and Asia should be a priority right now. > > > > To make this work well, we would need bandwidth authorities in Africa > > and Asia. Otherwise, those relays won't be used much. > > > > (We're working on it - I hope!) > > Just adding bw auths in Africa won't do too much, because the relevant > factor is who is dominating the median. If we had a majority of bwauths > there, the european/us relays would get measured worse. Also, the more > diversity we have, the worse the latency gets anyway - this is not to > say that we shouldn't add more diversity, but there'll be clearly > noticable issues. > > Maybe we could add something to the current system where we try to > estimate how much path length will make a measurement worse by default, > and compensate for that somehow. Otoh, the current state of bwauths is > so sad that I don't know if that'd be even remotely possible. Also such > a system must be resistant to tampering, of course. > > Cheers > Sebastian > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > -- Chris Adams <http://chrisada.co.uk>
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