Am 04.10.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Moritz Bartl:
> Still, this will not help in this (and related) cases: I have not yet > seen proven cases where the reputation of the netblock was endangered, > but if an ISP is afraid of that, there's no good way to cooperate. An > IDS is their obvious suggestion, which just shows that they don't > understand how Tor works. That is obviously true and kind of shame for a huge ISP, but you cant tell them frankly without putting your one year contract at risk and loosing further room for negotiation over a few thousands mile distance :-( >I argue strongly against deploying such > systems on Tor exits. It will mess up more than it does good, and it > won't be able to reliably detect *and block* bad behaviour. > _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
