On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 9:32 AM, Yawning Angel <yawn...@schwanenlied.me> wrote: > Like I noted in my reply to Paul S. if there was a way to > measure/quantify trust, or deal with the "people's Guards just
I'd agree that randomly handing off nodes is bad. And that there may be cases where structured handoff among operators or to new operators could be useful once such structure was developed. And that certainly people have handed off nodes amongst themselves privately many times before, be it amongst friends or some entity/sponsor running nodes where the original humans or entity has moved on, etc. More on the notion of trust and metrics in the mesh... "Node Operators Web Of Trust" https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-November/005710.html > potentially switched location That would be picked up in geoip, and should be something Tor checks for on each startup (I don't know if Tor blindly uses fingerprints already in state file or revalidates them against all other metrics of the user before use.) _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
