-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I understand the approach of this, but it again reverts back to the problem of people believing a product will provide them reasonable protection without the responsibility of having to take measures themselves. There are stories everyday in the newspapers who think using a fake name on Facebook is enough to stop police tracking the actions of that account to them.
As in the other reply to this message, the hardware isn't open source and there has been a critique posted below: https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/2j9caq/anonabox_tor_router_box_is_false_representation Well intentioned, but as many before me have highlighted; good intentions is not enough if the product does not provide true security. Tor is a technology like many things, but I feel this product is out to make a buck from open source software while under-delivering on it's promises by providing an inferior product. How many more times do we need people to be put off Tor because somebody makes a crap implementation and a headline follows with the usual "TOR IS BROKEN"? The money in that kickstarter is proof there is cash to fund such things, but it is now in the hands of people riding the wave following the NSA fallout in hope for profit and not actual innovation. - -T On 15/10/2014 15:51, Andrew Lewman wrote: > On 10/15/2014 08:00 AM, Thomas White wrote: >> I am personally hoping somebody high up in the Tor Project >> management will openly condemn this atrocity and hopefully >> Kickstarter and the funders will withdraw their funds before a >> whole load of people buy into this "security as a tool" idea. > > I'm more inclined to support him. He appears to be taking our > designs and thoughts verbatim from Jake's initial thoughts on a > torouter[1]. Access Now did some work on the OpenWRT version of the > torouter[2]. Now is our chance to help shape this into a product we > like. Others have tried to take their own approach without such > attention to technical details. > > I look forward to having some smart people analyze the final > product and figure out where the strengths and weaknesses lie. > Anonabox's response to this analysis will tell us far more than > anything else. > > > [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Torouter > > [2] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OpenWRT > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJUPrfNAAoJEE2uQiaesOsLubQQAJDa1egqSCNFv/ueivYNpfQN 8b7lJUaYNi6BX+E4U+/2YcVH8t6qzJaLTvKyiZCY0X4eXhcize+KFKUwKoCqDXhQ l5oXsfIG2q7+hdFNpwp3j96lOfjQ1MEqppAnoDHOV0W2AuFyA+Gm05WIjaj+VaPK Kehv6QjW61rlGexVzL1ISQu0QFzTLq/3AvpyaPgaXhyoCKQS/SztaB93/DaTBZrM lfH1gs0/oQibs6uNtPSo4kTc3Lnry9ET9fXXnC28lkJeLAkdJuhV7tyOfj6C55Kv V5lrWJG6jbOjdz0vKqf/t/1DGlHJns2dGirmbhQHDeyL+JbC5BAbPTy/ZOFbI6P5 e5tXoNbGR9oXzPvcd89yAK5FNqnoLsEl2tY5LJpB7F5KF0o1hzigmYod51L9Epda CT2aWyEeXs0q2lO4WtUME80Hfo2nerclXfErpfgUQsqrqTEiGZ8SDyVqA6PYsevV hGqXWjvGzBSB9+WriSGHnRzncVl+EH0PZHq084H0sEyKYLMRMRpUpkAyzlkQkHga 5hdL335BO0Jo5jPLG/N0IbStCBPgEGa5xPpmjxh7NJz4esPSvn+xWuL1OqfuyayO X6zcnTUD1u1jy3YUrF9CvRp2JyneU3fc6iJZhID9NJyXWDZH23NPtDbzMrS+oKXb wDTMoKJ7iqWqj0G5Q/gO =7LQU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
