On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 3:49 AM, Kostas Jakeliunas <kos...@jakeliunas.com>wrote:
> Making a separate thread so as not to pollute the challenger[1] one. > > Roger: you wanted to know (times are UTC if anyone cares), > > [22:08:35] [...] we now have a list of 1000 fingerprints, and we could >> pretend those are in the challenge and use our graphing/etc plans on them >> [22:08:45] they happen to be the relays vulnerable to our openssl bug >> [22:11:43] "what fraction of the tor network by consensus weight are >> they?" >> [22:11:49] "over time" > > > Given them[2], the challenger (with minimal changes to fix downloader and > to make Onionoo not falter)[4] will spit out the following results: > > - > http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln1024-combined-bandwidth.json > - > http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln1024-combined-weights.json > - > http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln1024-combined-clients.json[uh > oh, this one's empty. Why is it empty? Didn't look into it.] > - > http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln1024-combined-uptime.json > > > The 'combined-weights.json' is probably the one you might be after. But > that's all I did for now. > > You also said that these aren't all the vulnerable relays that there are > out there. You linked to a more complete list[3], but it has some typos, > etc. I haven't done anything with it, maybe someone will take over, or I > will do something later on. > fwiw, this is a beyond-hacky-could-fail quick thing[5] that gives you fingerprints of relays that were vulnerable in a recent vulnerable-relay-file[6] (ideally it would pull those vulnerable relays from some online source) that are in any consensus provided (default is latest consensus available in Tor Metrics): http://ravinesmp.com:7777/ Provide consensus using "/consensus/%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S" (standard UTC date format). Consensuses are available since ~2008. So e.g. current vulnerable relay fingerprint list intersected with an older consensus when there were heartbleeding openssl versions: http://ravinesmp.com:7777/consensus/2012-10-20%2016:00:00 (" http://ravinesmp.com:7777/consensus/2012-10-20 16:00:00") There's also a nice concise Nick's script to get the % of network bandwidth of any given list of relay fingerprints (bandwidth is the one in the consensus, so parts of it will be self-reported and parts of it will be measured)[7]. [5]: https://gist.github.com/wfn/11070928 [6]: http://freehaven.net/~arma/vulnerable-keys-2014-04-08b [7]: https://gist.github.com/nmathewson/10309480 [1]: > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004214.html > [2]: http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln_fingerprints.txt > [3]: http://freehaven.net/~arma/vulnerable-keys-2014-04-08b > [4]: commits: > - > https://github.com/wfn/challenger/commit/38d88bcb1136f97881f81152d3d883c4e9480188 > - > https://github.com/wfn/challenger/commit/39c800643c040474402fc62d2a2db75c25889dfc > - > https://github.com/wfn/challenger/commit/7425ef6fc00dedf3b2b7f2649e832fb4c93909ae
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