On Monday, August 13. 2012, 00:55:45 Roger Dingledine wrote: > This discussion really goes back to a simple question: is it better to > use our funding for more design and development, or for strengthening > the network? For exit relays, I think choosing "strengthen the network" > is a great and worthwhile experiment. But for bridges, since the current > Tor transport and current bridge distribution strategies are not great, > I think it's better to use funding for better designs and better code. > I should note that I actually encouraged VoA to want unpublished bridges: > if we set up fast bridges and published them via bridges.torproject.org > today, they'd get blocked quickly in China. > My understanding of bridge detection was, that Chinas GFW is able to detect the Tor SSL handshake and does active bridge probing after a successful connection to a (for the GFW) unknown bridge IP. So they should be able to block any bridge publish or unpublished very quickly, if someone from behind the GFW connects to a bridge. Am I missing something?
Regards, torland _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
