A caveat makes no real difference to me either.  We might add the same sort of 
caveats to any of the multitude of codepoint registration drafts that we 
*don't* adopt.  But we instead choose not to adopt them, especially when they 
have limited applicability.

On Mon, Jul 14, 2025, at 23:05, Sean Turner wrote:
> We kicked off an adoption call for Use of SLH-DSA in TLS 1.3; see [0]. 
> We called consensus [1], and that decision was appealed. We have 
> reviewed the messages and agree that we need to redo the adoption call 
> to get more input.
>
> What appears to be the most common concern, which we will take from 
> Panos' email, is that "SLH-DSA sigs are too large and slow for general 
> use in TLS 1.3 applications". One way to address this concern is to add 
> an applicablity statement to address this point. We would like to 
> propose that this (or something close to this) be added to the I-D:
>
> Applications that use SLH-DSA need to be aware that the signatures 
> sizes are large; the signature sizes for the cipher suites specified 
> herein range from 7,856 to 49,856 bytes. Likewise, the cipher suites 
> are considered slow. While these costs might be amoritized over the 
> cost of a long lived connection, the cipher suites specified herein are 
> not considered for general use in TLS 1.3.
>
> With this addition in mind, we would like to start another WG adoption 
> call for draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa. If you support adoption with the above 
> text (or something similar) and are willing to review and contribute 
> text, please send a message to the list. If you do not support adoption 
> of this draft with the above text (or something similar), please send a 
> message to the list and indicate why. This call will close at 2359 UTC 
> on 28 July 2025.
>
> Cheers,
> Deirdre, Joe, and Sean
>
> [0] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/o4KnXjI-OpuHPcB33e8e78rACb0/
> [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/hhLtBBctK5em6l82m7rgM6_hefo/
> [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa/
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