To put some meat on top of this, the kind of open questions (as discussed at RATS interim [1]) that the proposed WG aims to address for Confidential Computing (CC) -- our main motivation -- are:

 * What is the "long-term identity" of the CC workload? How is
   "long-term identity" assigned to the CC workload? Which entity
   supplies this "long-term identity"? How is that "Identity Supplier"
   trusted?
 * How is CA-certified Long-Term Key (LTK) injected in the CC workload
   in the first place? Which entity generates the LTK and how is that
   entity trusted?
 * Can Cloud Service Provider (CSP) /really/ be out of Trusted
   Computing Base (TCB)?
 * What does "freshness" mean for highly dynamic and long-lived workloads?
 * Does RATS Background-check model further complicates the problem
   rather than solving it? In other words, how to verify the Verifier?

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2025-rats-01/materials/slides-interim-2025-rats-01-sessa-identity-crisis-in-attested-tls-for-confidential-computing-01.pdf

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