Peter C writes:
> In ML-KEM, Bob derives b deterministically from m and H(ek).
> If Bob tried to reuse b with a different public key, then the
> re-encryption check would fail during decapsulation.

That check doesn't affect processing of valid ciphertexts, so it often
won't be tested, so some implementations will get it wrong (even if they
aren't actively suppressing code that doesn't seem necessary), exactly
the same way that we keep finding code that fails to check signatures.

Again, I'm not saying any of this is safe. I'm just pointing out some of
the possibilities that can be triggered by (1) implementors pursuing
speed and (2) code having bugs.

---D. J. Bernstein

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