> While it may not be feasible to notify a user, the threat of > widely deployed software that supports key exfiltration being > abused is real, and made worse by us standardising on this > way of documenting what is to be exfiltrated.
There already is widely deployed software that leaks key information. OpenSSL has a trace facility, normally compiled out, that reports PKCS#12 passwords[1]. The keylog stuff *is* compiled-out by default. The OpenSSL library also provides a register-callback function that will get private key material and that is always enabled which the OpenSSL project does not consider a security risk[2]. I assume OpenSSL qualifies as widely-deployed. :) As for us standardizing this information, I do not consider that a threat because it's pretty obvious to anyone reading the TLS RFC. And surely, saying "base64-UTF8" can't be considered part of anyone's threat model. [1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/26283 [2] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26288 _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
