I find Dennis’ writeup and most of his arguments convincing.
I don’t think the WG should adopt the draft.


From: Dennis Jackson <ietf=40dennis-jackson...@dmarc.ietf.org>
Sent: Tuesday, February 4, 2025 8:28 PM
To: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [TLS] Re: Adoption Call for Trust Anchor IDs


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It will not come as a surprise that I oppose adoption for the reasons laid out 
in 'Trust is non-negotiable' [1].

The claims that Trust Negotiation can improve security or compatibility just do 
not stand up to scrutiny. Especially as in over a year since first 
introduction, there has been no credible proposal for how TN could be deployed 
outside of browsers and major CDNs or how it could bring any benefit at all 
with such a limited scope for deployment. It's not like major CDNs struggle to 
offer certificates suitable for browsers.

Even if the deployability concerns could be solved and so Trust Negotiation 
enabled at scale, then it would cause much more harm than good. Managing one 
certificate chain and CA relationship is already painful for many website 
operators, but TN would compound that pain by allowing root programs to diverge 
and placing the onus on website operators to obtain and manage multiple 
certificate chains to ensure compatibility with each root program's clients.

It would also be a major abuse vector for users, who are much more likely to 
suffer than benefit from the resulting fragmentation of the WebPKI, as well as 
being put at risk by use of TN to establish new root programs with malicious or 
negligent stewardship (domestic PKIs, enshittification, ossification).

In both cases, the result is a claimed reduction in operational burden for root 
programs and major CDNs (who have the most capacity and expertise to handle it) 
and the very material transfer of risk and complexity to users and website 
operators (who are least well equipped).

As technologists evaluating a proposal that would alter the architecture of one 
of the Internet's most critical ecosystems, we owe users and website operators 
better.

Best,
Dennis

[1] 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jackson-tls-trust-is-nonnegotiable
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