Rather obviously, I support adoption. I believe TAI is a good starting point for a practical solution for the problem we agreed was a useful thing to solve at the interim.
> On Jan 15, 2025, at 8:59 AM, Joseph Salowey <j...@salowey.net> wrote: > > At the trust tussle Interim in October we had consensus that the working > group was interested in working on the following problem: > > “Avoid client trust conflicts by enabling servers to reliably and efficiently > support clients with diverse trust anchor lists, particularly in larger PKIs > where the existing certificate_authorities extension is not viable” > > After IETF 121, we asked for submissions for possible working group adoption > as a starting point for this work. We received two submissions: > > [1] Trust Anchor Identifiers, draft-beck-tls-trust-anchor-ids-03 > [2] Trust is non-negotiable, draft-jackson-tls-trust-is-nonnegotiable-00 > > [1] defines a new protocol mechanism, while [2] provides an explanation of > why the mechanism in [1] may not be needed and may be problematic. Since the > second draft does not define a protocol mechanism we are not considering it > for adoption, but we request that working group members review both documents > and use [2] as input into determining whether we should adopt [1] as a > working group item. Adoption as a working group item means the working group > has change control over and can modify it as necessary; an adopted document > is only a starting point. Please respond to this thread if you think the > document should be adopted as a working group item. If you think the document > is not appropriate for adoption please indicate why. This adoption call will > close on February 7, 2025. Also please remember to maintain professional > behavior and keep the discussion focused on technical issues. > > Thanks, > > Sean, Deirdre and Joe > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
