Hi all, The updated draft https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa/, incorporates feedback received from the WG. It outlines how ML-DSA in combination with traditional algorithms can be utilized for authentication in TLS 1.3.
Further, comments and suggestions are welcome. Best Regards, -Tiru ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: <internet-dra...@ietf.org> Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 at 16:55 Subject: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-00.txt To: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K <kond...@gmail.com>, John Gray < john.g...@entrust.com>, Scott Fluhrer <sfluh...@cisco.com>, Timothy Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com> A new version of Internet-Draft draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa Revision: 00 Title: Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3 Date: 2024-11-14 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 8 URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-00.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa/ HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-00.html HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa Abstract: This document specifies how the post-quantum signature scheme ML-DSA [FIPS204], in combination with traditional algorithms RSA- PKCS#1v1.5,RSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448 can be used for authentication in TLS 1.3. The composite ML-DSA approach is beneficial in deployments where operators seek additional protection against potential breaks or catastrophic bugs in ML-DSA. The IETF Secretariat
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