The following errata report has been submitted for RFC9147,
"The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3".

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You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid8141

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Type: Technical
Reported by: Nick Harper <i...@nharper.org>

Section: 4

Original Text
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   This 128-bit value is used in the ACK message as well as in the
   "record_sequence_number" input to the Authenticated Encryption with
   Associated Data (AEAD) function.

Corrected Text
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   This 128-bit value is used in the ACK message.

Notes
-----
The end of this paragraph contradicts this by saying "In DTLS 1.3 the 64-bit 
sequence_number is used as the sequence number for the AEAD computation". If 
the 128-bit value was used as the "record sequence number" as described in RFC 
8446 section 5.3, it appears that would require the AEAD to have an N_MAX of at 
least 16 bytes to fit all of the 128 bits, and none of the TLS 1.3 AEADs have 
an N_MAX that big. Thus, I assume the end of the paragraph is correct and the 
opening is incorrect.

Instructions:
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RFC9147 (draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43)
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Title               : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol 
Version 1.3
Publication Date    : April 2022
Author(s)           : E. Rescorla, H. Tschofenig, N. Modadugu
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Transport Layer Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

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