The following errata report has been submitted for RFC9147, "The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
-------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid8108 -------------------------------------- Type: Technical Reported by: David Benjamin <david...@chromium.org> Section: 7.2 Original Text ------------- acknowledgements for records which have already been ACKed. As noted above, the receipt of any record responding to a given flight MUST be taken as an implicit acknowledgement for the entire flight to which it is responding. Corrected Text -------------- acknowledgements for records which have already been ACKed. As noted above, the receipt of any record responding to a given flight MUST be taken as an implicit acknowledgement for the entire flight to which it is responding. If any element of record_numbers in the ACK references an epoch that is higher than the epoch in which the ACK was received, the implementation MUST terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert. Notes ----- Section 7 discusses that you cannot send ACKs for later epochs, but does not say anything about what the receiver does. To prevent an attacker from, e.g., using a plaintext ACK to interfere with ACKs of an encrypted epoch, I think we need to tell the receiver to check this. Otherwise we need to be much more explicit about the points at which the receiver MUST close old epochs. Honestly, we probably should be explicit about this too, but we should also be clear on this point. Instructions: ------------- This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". (If it is spam, it will be removed shortly by the RFC Production Center.) Please use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party will log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. -------------------------------------- RFC9147 (draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43) -------------------------------------- Title : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3 Publication Date : April 2022 Author(s) : E. Rescorla, H. Tschofenig, N. Modadugu Category : PROPOSED STANDARD Source : Transport Layer Security Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
