On my computer (Windows 10 LTSC 2021 x64), run openssl in a Debian 12 VM
user@debian:~$ openssl speed ecdhp256
Doing 256 bits ecdh's for 10s: 236351 256-bits ECDH ops in 10.13s
version: 3.0.11
built on: Mon Oct 23 17:52:22 2023 UTC
options: bn(64,64)
compiler: gcc -fPIC -pthread -m64 -Wa,--noexecstack -Wall -fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr -DOPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=2 -Wa,--noexecstack -g -O2 -ffile-prefix-map=/build/reproducible-path/openssl-3.0.11=. -fstack-protector-strong -Wformat -Werror=format-security -DOPENSSL_USE_NODELETE -DL_ENDIAN -DOPENSSL_PIC -DOPENSSL_BUILDING_OPENSSL -DNDEBUG -Wdate-time -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
CPUINFO: OPENSSL_ia32cap=0xfffa32234f8bffff:0x9840079c219c27eb
op op/s
256 bits ecdh (nistp256) 0.0000s 23331.8
user@debian:~$ openssl speed ecdhx25519
Doing 253 bits ecdh's for 10s: 389226 253-bits ECDH ops in 10.12s
version: 3.0.11
built on: Mon Oct 23 17:52:22 2023 UTC
options: bn(64,64)
compiler: gcc -fPIC -pthread -m64 -Wa,--noexecstack -Wall -fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr -DOPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL=2 -Wa,--noexecstack -g -O2 -ffile-prefix-map=/build/reproducible-path/openssl-3.0.11=. -fstack-protector-strong -Wformat -Werror=format-security -DOPENSSL_USE_NODELETE -DL_ENDIAN -DOPENSSL_PIC -DOPENSSL_BUILDING_OPENSSL -DNDEBUG -Wdate-time -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
CPUINFO: OPENSSL_ia32cap=0xfffa32234f8bffff:0x9840079c219c27eb
op op/s
253 bits ecdh (X25519) 0.0000s 38461.1
06.06.2024, 18:22, "Hubert Kario" <hka...@redhat.com>:
On Thursday, 6 June 2024 00:57:52 CEST, A A wrote:
"E.g. a client might also have legitimate reasons to nudge
servers to use a stronger curve than P-256 in the initial CH and
only fall back to weaker curves by explicit request via HRR.
Probably the reason for Chrome for requesting HRR for P-256 is
the attempt to nudge servers to use an algorithm which is
believed to provide advantages for the client-side
implementation (possibly both, speed/power or security or
bandwidth) in comparison to P-256."
About speed: https://bench.cr.yp.to/results-dh.html shows that
on amd64; Zen 4 (a60f12); 2023 AMD Ryzen 7 7700; 8 x 3800MHz;
hertz, supercop-20240425,
nistp256(P-256) needs 202616 cycles to generate a key pair,
535274 cycles to compute a shared secret;
Curve25519 needs 101289cycles to generate a key pair, 109491
cycles to compute a shared secret;
And, X25519's key share only need 32 bytes, P-256 needs 65
bytes. Conclusion: P-256 neither has security nor performance
(power) advantage compare with X25519.
That's not the performance delta I see in practice.
Fedora 39, openssl-3.1.1-4.fc39.x86_64, i7-10850H
x25519 derive shared secret: 35062.2 op/s
P-256 derive shared secret: 22741.1 op/s
(run `openssl speed ecdhp256; openssl speed ecdhx25519` to try yourself)
05.06.2024, 22:05, "Björn Haase"
<bjoern.haase=40endress....@dmarc.ietf.org>:
Hi Eric, Hi all,One more thing: we are finalizing RFC 8446-bis right now, so if there is
WG consensus to require that clients offer all MTI curves in the key_shares
of their initial CH, then that would be a straightforward text change.
I think that we might rather keep a mechanism that preserves
the possibility of the client-side to express a preference
regarding a specific cipher suite / curve and accept other
curves only using the HRR-mechanism.
E.g. a client might also have legitimate reasons to nudge
servers to use a stronger curve than P-256 in the initial CH and
only fall back to weaker curves by explicit request via HRR.
Probably the reason for Chrome for requesting HRR for P-256 is
the attempt to nudge servers to use an algorithm which is
believed to provide advantages for the client-side
implementation (possibly both, speed/power or security or
bandwidth) in comparison to P-256.
Björn.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen | Best Regards
Dr. Björn Haase
Senior Expert Electronics | TGREH Electronics Hardware
Endress+Hauser Liquid Analysis
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Gerlingen | Germany
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