Mike Shaver <mike.sha...@gmail.com> writes: >You mentioned in another message that some embedded TLS implementations also >omit MTI support for code size or attack surface reasons.
They don't omit MTI support, they *only* support MTI (think Grigg's Law, "there is only one mode and that is secure"). So when faced with an implementation that doesn't, they can't talk to each other. >do you have any sense of why Chrome chose to omit this MTI support? I suspect it's just because Google does whatever Google wants to (see e.g. https://fy.blackhats.net.au/blog/2024-04-26-passkeys-a-shattered-dream/, section "The Warnings"). This may not be politically expendient to say out loud :-). Peter. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
