Dear chairs,
I asked before (in this thread) and having received no response, I would
reiterate to understand why it is not possible to do all communication
with the triage panel transparently on the mailing list. I think
discussing directly on the mailing list would give authors an
opportunity to get earlier comments and provide/ask for any possible
clarification rather than having to wait for one month. It will also
give an opportunity to formal analysis enthusiasts to understand the
rationale.
Also, I am curious why are the chairs even hiding which response comes
from whom in the panel? If the authors have some
questions/clarifications (which Russ actually has in this case), will
the chairs again go underground with the triage panel and then bring
"anonymous" answers to these questions.
On 30.05.24 20:26, Russ Housley wrote:
On May 20, 2024, at 6:04 PM, Deirdre Connolly
<durumcrustu...@gmail.com> wrote:
- support for a proper security analysis to shore up the security
arguments: for authentication properties, a Tamarin analysis may do
Firstly, why Tamarin? Why not ProVerif?
Secondly, what /exactly/ do you mean by "may"? For instance, if the
Tamarin proof is provided, could it be that the chairs/panel then say:
hey, that's great; we would now like some computational analysis to be
more confident.
I see much more need for analysis when it comes to the authentication
properties of the PSK (psk/cert combination), whereas the secrecy
(assuming authentication is a non-goal) is much more straightforward.
Who will perform this analysis? I asked a researcher to perform such
an analysis, and the response was that it is too simple to get a
paper. Now waht?
Russ, if you absolutely find no one, I will be happy to work on it over
the weekends (so it will be slow). Also to clarify, I prefer to work
with ProVerif because in my initial experiments, ProVerif was always way
faster than Tamarin.
For the authentication analysis, I think here a Tamarin-like
analysis might be useful for checking undesirable interactions; for
example, could anything go wrong if a single PSK is used both as a
traditional PSK but also as an external PSK?
Here is why I would like to see at least name of the panelist who wrote
this. If it is Cas, it makes perfect sense to me. If it is someone else,
I would like to know why he would prefer to recommend Tamarin over
ProVerif. What exactly is missing in ProVerif that would make it
unsuitable for this analysis? Or is it some usability issue?
Best Regards,
Usama
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