On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 4:10 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
u...@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

> Also, what are the WG's thoughts on including standalone PQC signatures in
> the same draft?
>
>
>
> I think that including standalone PQC sigs would be very desirable.
>
>
>
> I don't think there is any particular reason to include PQC signatures in
> the same draft as PQ key establishment. In TLS 1.3, key establishment and
> signature are orthogonal concepts, and it will be easier to review if they
> are kept in separate documents.
>
>
>
> On the one hand – you’re correct. On the other hand, though, considering
> implicitly-authenticated protocols, such as MQV, HMQV etc…?
>
*Yes I’m aware that they don’t use explicit signatures, except to validate
> certificates.*
>

TLS 1.3 does not support MQV or HMQV.

-Ekr


>
>
> *From:* TLS <tls-boun...@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Deirdre Connolly
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 5, 2024 9:15 PM
> *To:* TLS@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [TLS] ML-KEM key agreement for TLS 1.3
>
>
>
> I have uploaded a preliminary version of ML-KEM for TLS 1.3
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement/>
> and have a more fleshed out
> <https://github.com/dconnolly/draft-tls-mlkem-key-agreement> version to
> be uploaded when datatracker opens. It is a straightforward new
> `NamedGroup` to support key agreement via ML-KEM-768 or ML-KEM-1024, in a
> very similar style to -hybrid-design
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/>.
>
>
>
> It will be nice to have pure-PQ options (that are FIPS / CNSA 2.0
> compatible) ready to go when users are ready to use them.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> Deirdre
>
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
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