On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 3:56 PM Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth= 40entrust....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> Right. I’m just thinking out loud here. > > > > If the Generic is > > > > KDF(counter || KEM1_ct || KEM1_ss || KEM2_ct || KEM2_ss || fixedInfo) > > > > And X-Wing is: > > > > SHA3-256( “\.//^\” || ML-KEM_ss || X25519_ss || X25519_ct || X25519_pk ) > > > > It looks pretty close to me; you’ve dropped the ML-KEM CT, added the > X25519 recipient public key, and moved the fixedInfo from the end to the > beginning. > > > > The question is: is that close enough to be considered a profile? Do we > want to adapt the Generic so that X-Wing is properly a profile? > The X-Wing combiner is not necessarily secure when instantiated with other primitives. The big one is that we need a ciphertext collision resistant KEM. Also we use that ML-KEM mixes in its own public key in the shared secret. And then there are more assumptions: assuming fixed length ciphertext/shared secrets, assuming we fit within the KDF block size (see Dan's e-mail). We could make the generic combiner simpler depending on the primitives used, but that will make the generic combiner specification much more complex/subtle. Binding to the ECC public keys is probably not a bad idea in general. > Certainly it would make no sense for some IETF protocols to use X-Wing > while others use the ML-KEM + X25519 instantiation of the generic. I think > I’m convincing myself that the Generic should be adjusted so that X-Wing is > the obvious instantiation for ML-KEM + X25519. > > > > Aside: do you have an opinion about fixedInfo as a prefix vs a suffix? We > chose suffix simply because it more obviously aligns with SP 800-56Cr2, and > we’ve all had the experience of FIPS labs being picky about things like > that. > > > > --- > > *Mike* Ounsworth > > > > *From:* Bas Westerbaan <bas=40cloudflare....@dmarc.ietf.org> > *Sent:* Thursday, January 11, 2024 7:07 AM > *To:* Mike Ounsworth <mike.ounswo...@entrust.com> > *Cc:* IRTF CFRG <c...@irtf.org>; <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>; Deirdre > Connolly <durumcrustu...@gmail.com>; k...@cupdev.net > *Subject:* Re: [EXTERNAL] [CFRG] X-Wing: the go-to PQ/T hybrid KEM? > > > > Speaking for myself (not for my co-authors), this feels like friendly, > complementary work to draft-ounsworth-cfrg-kem-combiners; I agree. We could > consider adding a section with concrete instantiations, and the first one > would be X-Wing 😊 (followed > > > > Speaking for myself (not for my co-authors), this feels like friendly, > complementary work to draft-ounsworth-cfrg-kem-combiners; > > > > I agree. > > > > We could consider adding a section with concrete instantiations, and the > first one would be X-Wing 😊 (followed by ML-KEM + P-256, Brainpool, and > RSA variants). > > > > I guess that leads to the following question: @Bas Westerbaan > <bas=40cloudflare....@dmarc.ietf.org>, @Deirdre Connolly > <durumcrustu...@gmail.com>, Peter, would you be open to merging X-Wing > into the generic combiner draft, or is there value in it being standalone? > > > > X-Wing explicitly trades genericity for simplicity. We will not get such a > simple and efficient construction if it is the instantiation of an > easy-to-use generic construction. > > > > Best, > > > > Bas > > > > > > --- > > *Mike* Ounsworth > > > > *From:* CFRG <cfrg-boun...@irtf.org> *On Behalf Of *Bas Westerbaan > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 10, 2024 2:14 PM > *To:* IRTF CFRG <c...@irtf.org>; <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org> > *Cc:* k...@cupdev.net > *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] [CFRG] X-Wing: the go-to PQ/T hybrid KEM? > > > > Dear tls and cfrg working groups, With ML-KEM (née Kyber) expected to be > finalized this year, it’s time to revisit the question of which PQ/T hybrid > KEMs to standardize, and which to recommend. # Status quo For TLS at the > time of writing there > > Dear tls and cfrg working groups, > > With ML-KEM (née Kyber) expected to be finalized this year, it’s time to > revisit the question of which PQ/T hybrid KEMs to standardize, and which to > recommend. > > # Status quo > > For TLS at the time of writing there are two PQ/T hybrids registered: > X25519Kyber768 [1] and P256Kyber768 [2]. The former has been deployed > widely [3]. Both are instances of the hybrid-design draft [4], which use > the simple combiner ss_ECC || ss_Kyber, which is suitable for TLS, but not > for other applications such as HPKE, as it’s not IND-CCA2 robust [5]. > > For HPKE, there is a different KEM called X25519Kyber768 [6], which uses a > different combiner that mixes in the X25519 ephemeral key, by using HPKE’s > DHKEM construction instead of raw X25519. > > There is also the ounsworth-kem-combiners I-D [7] that informed by [5] > proposes the generic combiner > > KDF( counter || ct1 || ss1 || ct2 || ss2 || fixedInfo, outputBits ) > > From a security standpoint that would be suitable for HPKE and TLS. To TLS > it is somewhat unattractive as it requires hashing the typically large PQ > ciphertexts, and adds some extra hashing in the conversion of the ECDH into > a KEM. On the other hand, for TLS it would be nice to have a KEM that is > also suitable for HPKE, as HPKE is used in ECH. > > From a usability perspective, ounsworth-kem-combiners requires the user to > make several choices: which KEMs and in particular which method to use to > turn ECDH into a KEM, which security levels, which KDF, etc. > > # The proposal: X-Wing > > Let us introduce X-Wing [0]. The goal of X-Wing is to be *the* go-to PQ/T > hybrid KEM for the majority of use cases (including TLS and HPKE): no need > to make choices, or understand the subtleties. > > X-Wing aims for 128-bit security, and for that combines the time-tested > X25519 with ML-KEM-768 [8]. X-Wing uses the combiner > > SHA3-256( xwing-label || ss_ML-KEM || ss_X25519 || ct_X25519 || > pk_X25519 ) > > Here ss_X25519 is the plain X25519 shared secret; ct_X25519 is the > ephemeral public key; xwing-label a 6-byte label. Note that it doesn’t hash > in the ML-KEM ciphertext. For a generic KEM one cannot leave out the > ciphertext, but in the case of ML-KEM we can, assuming we can model > SHA3/SHAKE as a random oracle. This is proven in [0]. The gist is that FO > transform in ML-KEM makes it “ciphertext collision resistant”: even if the > underlying lattice problem is broken, it’s infeasible to create from one > ciphertext another different ciphertext with the same shared secret. > > # Not final > > We would love to hear your input: X-Wing is not final. For one, ML-KEM > itself might still change (presumably only in minor ways) before final > standardization. We think the CFRG would be a good venue to standardize > X-Wing — do you concur? > > Best, > > Bas, Deirdre, Karolin, Manuel, Peter > > > PS. We want to mention explicitly that we see value in the kem-combiners > and hybrid-design drafts as generic safe methods to construct hybrids for > those use cases where X-Wing would not suffice. > > > [0] Spec: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing-kem/ > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing-kem/__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-Y-JP2DY$> > Proof: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/039 > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/eprint.iacr.org/2024/039__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-Xl0zY2C$> > [1] Full name X25519Kyber768Draft00. > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00/ > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00/__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-bUDJTlz$> > [2] Full name SecP256r1Kyber768Draft00. > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-kyber/ > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-kyber/__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-cpge9_6$> > [3] > https://blog.chromium.org/2023/08/protecting-chrome-traffic-with-hybrid.html > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/blog.chromium.org/2023/08/protecting-chrome-traffic-with-hybrid.html__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-X2cJwvg$> > https://twitter.com/bwesterb/status/1734586155868287457 > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/twitter.com/bwesterb/status/1734586155868287457__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-agVitjD$> > [4] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-stebila-tls-hybrid-design/ > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-stebila-tls-hybrid-design/__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-axrezMz$> > [5] https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-76578-5_7 > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-76578-5_7__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-U_tyIdl$> > [6] > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-westerbaan-cfrg-hpke-xyber768d00/ > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-westerbaan-cfrg-hpke-xyber768d00/__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-V-p_aAA$> > [7] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-cfrg-kem-combiners/ > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-cfrg-kem-combiners/__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YuGyk3egE_PIU03oVixCUPtatL8PHtv4HwoB1vN5giqCIDkH6AQcs-lATDzPlozu91nN60pT2kp1AwmLESgzB4xc58lF-bx4gLTn$> > [8] Following earlier deployment of X25519Kyber768, despite targeting 128 > bits, we use ML-KEM-768 instead of ML-KEM-512 to hedge against advances in > lattice attacks. > >
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