Hiya,

On 19/09/2023 01:45, Sean Turner wrote:
Hi! After discussions with the authors of draft-ietf-tls-esni, Joe
and I would like to determine whether there is consensus to request
two early code point assignments; see RFC 7120. One is for the
encrypted_client_hello extension and one is for the ech_required
alert; see s11 of the I-D. Please let the list know by 03 October
2023 if you support these early allocations.

I support doing that.

I wonder if we also need to say something about the ech= SVCB
parameter value 5 that's reserved at [1]? Not sure, but maybe
no harm to make that "official" at the same time if possible.
(There could be current code that assumes that 5 in a wire-
format HTTPS RR value maps to 0xff0d within an ECHConfigList
even if that isn't really right.)

I'd also like if we had some agreement about how to handle
experiments that should migrate from current codepoints to
new ones. I don't really mind how we do that, but it should
help if we try publicly co-ordinate the timing for changing
from 0xff0d to a new codepoint. Given there aren't that many
implementations or deployments, a flag-day might be ok, (or
even useful?) but I dunno if a flag-day would be ok for
everyone, or if we need to plan for some short-ish duration
during which both old and new codepoints warrant some level
of support, just so as not to break existing things and look
bad:-) And if we will have some such interregnum, then it'd
probably also be good to say if we expect that to be handled
via ECHConfigList's that have >1 entry and version or if we
expect people to support >1 HTTPS RR value be published. I
think all of that could be handled via a "here's the
plan:..." mail sent to this list though and doesn't need
more than that.

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https#name-initial-contents

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