Hiya,

On 17/05/2023 15:11, Salz, Rich wrote:
This is the "TLS 1.2 is frozen" draft promised in Yokohama.  I am
pleased to have Nimrod as co-author.  We think this is ready for
adoption :)

I'd be supportive of adoption. I think the draft could
do with a clearer statement to the effect that this one
will likely be "held" in the WG until there's rough
consensus that it's timely to make it an RFC, but
otherwise it seems good enough to adopt.

I'd guess this probably ought be a BCP too though, but
don't care that much.

I don't know if there'll need to be more exceptions
carved out for IANA registries or not, but that is
probably better debated after adoption.

Cheers,
S.



On 5/17/23, 10:08 AM, "internet-dra...@ietf.org
<mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>" <internet-dra...@ietf.org
<mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>> wrote:




A new version of I-D, draft-rsalz-tls-tls12-frozen-00.txt has been
successfully submitted by Rich Salz and posted to the IETF
repository.


Name: draft-rsalz-tls-tls12-frozen Revision: 00 Title: TLS 1.2 is
Frozen Document date: 2023-05-17 Group: Individual Submission Pages:
8 URL:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-rsalz-tls-tls12-frozen-00.txt Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rsalz-tls-tls12-frozen/ Html:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-rsalz-tls-tls12-frozen-00.html Htmlized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rsalz-tls-tls12-frozen




Abstract: TLS 1.2 is in widespread use and can be configured such
that it provides good security properties. TLS 1.3 is also in
widespread use and fixes some known deficiencies with TLS 1.2, such
as removing error-prone cryptographic primitives and encrypting more
of the traffic so that it is not readable by outsiders.


Both versions have several extension points, so items like new cryptographic algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named curves"), etc., can be added without defining a new protocol. This document specifies that TLS 1.2 is frozen: no new algorithms or extensions will be approved.


Further, TLS 1.3 use is widespread, and new protocols should require and assume its existence.








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