On Thu, Mar 30, 2023 at 3:58 PM David Benjamin <david...@chromium.org> wrote:
> post_handshake_auth was only in TLS 1.3 because some folks relied on an > existing (and terrible :-) ) corresponding mechanism in TLS 1.2: trigger a > renegotiation and request a client certificate in the new handshake. I > don't think it makes sense to backport post_handshake_auth to TLS 1.2. Such > a backport would also require much more analysis than the average > extension, since it concerns authentication. > No disagreement from me. My point was only that such things are already in the IANA registry. thanks, Rob
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