Dear TLS Working Group,
I am writing to propose a new method for enhancing the security of mutual authentication in TLS. The current TLS protocol requires the exchange of client and server certificates in cleartext during the initial handshake, which exposes sensitive client information to potential man-in-the-middle attacks. In order to address this vulnerability, I propose implementing a second handshake that requests the client certificate only after the secure channel has been established. Under this method, if the client chooses to engage in mutual authentication and sends their certificate, the security can be renegotiated using the client certificate instead of the server certificate. This would provide an additional layer of security, as any attacker intercepting the exchange would not be able to discern how the new secure channel was negotiated. I believe this proposed method would be compatible with TLS 1.4, without disrupting backward compatibility with earlier versions such as TLS 1.3. As mutual authentication implies a desire for stronger security, any potential increase in overhead or processing required by this method would likely be acceptable to users. Moreover, this proposal would also be in line with GDPR requirements, as it would reduce the amount of client information exchanged during the initial handshake and offer more control over personal data. Thank you for considering my proposal. I would be happy to discuss this idea further or provide additional details as needed. Best regards, Yannick LaRue
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