Hi Viktor, Are point compressed secp256r1 RPKs supported?
- Uncompressed secp256r1 RPKs are 91 bytes. - Point compressed secp256r1 RPKs are 59 bytes - Ed25519 RPKs are 58 bytes Cheers, John From: TLS <tls-boun...@ietf.org> on behalf of Achim Kraus <achimkr...@gmx.net> Date: Sunday, 22 January 2023 at 22:02 To: tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-d...@dukhovni.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] FYI, RFC7250 (raw public keys) to be supported in OpenSSL ~3.2 Hello Viktor, > Thanks to Todd Short, RFC7250 raw public keys should be available in > OpenSSL ~3.2. Applications that use unauthenticated opportunistic TLS, Sounds great. Especially for IoT/constraint use-cases that's a real benefit. Just in the case, someone is interested, I asked a couple of months ago, if https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-10 has some considerations about certificate types without a validation date. See https://protect2.fireeye.com/v1/url?k=31323334-501d5122-313273af-454445555731-1d6e8c010f9a9db6&q=1&e=45adec37-94c0-453e-b42c-80479cc77e30&u=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Ftlswg%2Ftls-subcerts%2Fissues%2F107 > The pull request > <https://protect2.fireeye.com/v1/url?k=31323334-501d5122-313273af-454445555731-66e352cf1acf4bf8&q=1&e=45adec37-94c0-453e-b42c-80479cc77e30&u=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fopenssl%2Fopenssl%2Fpull%2F18185> > is > still a work in progress, but complete enough for application > integration testing. I will try to test next week the DTLS interoperability with Eclipse/tinydtls Eclipse/Californium best regards Achim Am 22.01.23 um 21:41 schrieb Viktor Dukhovni: > Thanks to Todd Short, RFC7250 raw public keys should be available in > OpenSSL ~3.2. Applications that use unauthenticated opportunistic TLS, > employ DANE or have other ways to avoid X.509 certificates and make do > with raw peer public keys can avoid the overhead of receiving and > processing certificate chains. > > The pull request > <https://protect2.fireeye.com/v1/url?k=31323334-501d5122-313273af-454445555731-66e352cf1acf4bf8&q=1&e=45adec37-94c0-453e-b42c-80479cc77e30&u=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fopenssl%2Fopenssl%2Fpull%2F18185> > is > still a work in progress, but complete enough for application > integration testing. Likely too late for OpenSSL 3.1 (in beta now), but > seems likely to land by 3.2. The TODO items on the OpenSSL side are > at this point IMHO minor. Review eyeballs of course always appreciated. > > I have a Postfix branch with a reasonably complete implementation: > > # posttls-finger -c <domain> > posttls-finger: <mxhost>[192.0.2.1]:25: raw public key fingerprint=<...> > posttls-finger: <mxhost>[192.0.2.1]:25: Matched DANE raw public key: 3 1 > 1 <...> > posttls-finger: Verified TLS connection established to > <mxhost>[192.0.2.1]:25: > TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) > key-exchange X25519 > server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) > server-digest SHA256 > > based on the the current state of the pull request. > _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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