> - Ticket-based PSKs carry over the server certificate from the previous > connection
What does "carry over" mean here? That the client literally holds on to the certificate and re-evaluates it before resumption? Or just that the trust from evaluating the certificate during the initial handshake also applies to the PSK? Because, AFAICT, the literal ticket isn't required to contain the server certificate. > On Aug 11, 2021, at 2:13 PM, David Benjamin <david...@chromium.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 5:00 PM Carrick Bartle > <cbartle891=40icloud....@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40icloud....@dmarc.ietf.org>> > wrote: > > Notably, it still relies on the server certificate being re-validated > > against the new SNI at the > > session resumption time. > > Where is this specified? I can't find it in RFC 8446. (Sorry if I missed it.) > > Does RFC 8446 actually say this? I haven't looked carefully, but I suspect, > if it says anything useful, it's implicit in how resumption works: > > - If the client offers a PSK, it must be okay with the server authenticating > as that PSK for this connection > - Ticket-based PSKs carry over the server certificate from the previous > connection > - Therefore, in order to offer a ticket in a connection, the client must be > okay with that previous server certificate in the context of that connection. > Server name, trust anchors, and all. > > This is another one of those cases where cross-SNI resumption is just a more > obvious example of a general principle that needs to be written down > somewhere in TLS proper. (Even with the same SNI, suppose two different parts > of my application use different trust stores. My session resumption decisions > must be consistent with that.) > > > However, in the absence of additional signals, it discourages using a > > session ticket when the SNI value > does not match ([RFC8446], Section > > 4.6.1), as there is normally no reason to assume that all servers > > sharing the same certificate would also share the same session keys. > > It'd be helpful to describe under what circumstances there is reason to > assume that servers that share the same certificate also share the same > session keys (and are able to take advantage of cross-SNI resumption). > > > > On Jul 30, 2021, at 6:57 PM, Christopher Wood <c...@heapingbits.net > > <mailto:c...@heapingbits.net>> wrote: > > > > Given the few responses received thus far, we're going to extend this WGLC > > for another two weeks. It will now conclude on August 13. > > > > Best, > > Chris, for the chairs > > > > On Fri, Jul 16, 2021, at 4:55 PM, Christopher Wood wrote: > >> This is the working group last call for the "Transport Layer Security > >> (TLS) Resumption across Server Names" draft, available here: > >> > >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-cross-sni-resumption/ > >> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-cross-sni-resumption/> > >> > >> Please review this document and send your comments to the list by July > >> 30, 2021. The GitHub repository for this draft is available here: > >> > >> https://github.com/vasilvv/tls-cross-sni-resumption > >> <https://github.com/vasilvv/tls-cross-sni-resumption> > >> > >> Thanks, > >> Chris, on behalf of the chairs > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> TLS mailing list > >> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls> > >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > > TLS mailing list > > TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls> > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>
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