It is incredibly difficult to draw a line so precisely as to where the threat to a device begins and ends, given the wide range of deployment scenarios. If a device can be at all critical (and even if it isn’t), then it should be upgraded or replaced. Better that this be out there in its current form so that other organizations that specify TLS requirements can pick this document up without any wiggle room or ambiguity. Also, we do not have a “Sometimes Deprecated” category, nor do I think we should start here.
Eliot > On 1 Dec 2020, at 10:29, Peter Gutmann <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote: > > Stephen Farrell <stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie> writes: > >> That said, if someone had words to suggest that might garner consensus, that >> would be good. > > I think all it needs is something along the lines of "This BCP applies to TLS > as used on the public Internet [Not part of the text but meaning the area that > the IETF creates standards for]. Since TLS has been adopted in a large number > of areas outside of this, considerations for use in these areas are left to > relevant standards bodies to define". > > Peter. > > > -- > last-call mailing list > last-c...@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
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