Hi Achim

Your local network "light bulb" is likely not a big issue

But what about heath devices, autonomous cars, nuclear plants, blockchain
transfers ?. Maybe, they are not in the IoT scope...

Best Regards

Pascal


Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 19:57, Achim Kraus <achimkr...@gmx.net> a écrit :

> Hi Pascal,
>
> that using these ISO 7816 card is fast and save, doesn't say too much
> about the use-case without that card, or? For sure, there are
> micro-controller, which are also equipped with hw-ecc or hw-rsa. And
> there are more secure-devices protecting credentials. But there are also
> still ones without.
> I'm not sure, if I want spend too much money in my local network "light
> bulb". Isn't it always a question of what to protect in which environment?
>
> best regards
> Achim
>
> Am 21.09.20 um 14:53 schrieb Pascal Urien:
> > tls-se memory footprint is
> > flash 《 40KB
> > ram   《 1KB
> >
> > time to open a tls session 1.4 seconds
> >
> >
> > Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 14:47, Pascal Urien <pascal.ur...@gmail.com
> > <mailto:pascal.ur...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
> >
> >     hi Hannes
> >
> >     no openssl or wolfssl are used as client in order to check
> >     interoperability with tls-se server
> >
> >     tls-se is of course a specific implémentation for tls13 server in
> >     javacard..it is written in java but an ôter implémentation is
> >     written in c for constraint notes. as written in the draft tls-se
> >     implementation has three software blocks: crypto lib, tls state
> >     machine, and tls lib
> >
> >
> >
> >     Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 14:36, Hannes Tschofenig
> >     <hannes.tschofe...@arm.com <mailto:hannes.tschofe...@arm.com>> a
> écrit :
> >
> >         Hi Pascal, ____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         are you saying that the stack on the secure element uses WolfSSL
> >         or OpenSSL? I am sure that WolfSSL works well but for code size
> >         reasons I doubt OpenSSL is possible. Can you confirm? ____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         In case of WolfSSL, you have multiple options for credentials,
> >         including plain PSK, PSK-ECDHE, raw public keys, and
> >         certificates as I noted in my mail to the UTA list: ____
> >
> >
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/uta/RJ4wU77D6f7qslfwrc16jkrPTew/____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         Ciao____
> >
> >         Hannes____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         *From:* Pascal Urien <pascal.ur...@gmail.com
> >         <mailto:pascal.ur...@gmail.com>>
> >         *Sent:* Monday, September 21, 2020 2:01 PM
> >         *To:* Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@arm.com
> >         <mailto:hannes.tschofe...@arm.com>>
> >         *Cc:* Filippo Valsorda <fili...@ml.filippo.io
> >         <mailto:fili...@ml.filippo.io>>; tls@ietf.org <mailto:
> tls@ietf.org>
> >         *Subject:* Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         Hi Hannes____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         Yes it has been tested with several  3.04 Javacards
> >         commercially available____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         In the draft https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00
> >           Section 5-ISO 7816 Use Case, the exchanges are done with the
> >         existing implementation____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         TLS-SE TLS1.3 PSK+ECDH server works with ESP8266 or
> >         Arduino+Ethernet boards ____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         For client software we use OPENSSL or WolfSSL____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         Pascal____
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         __ __
> >
> >         Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 12:35, Hannes Tschofenig
> >         <hannes.tschofe...@arm.com <mailto:hannes.tschofe...@arm.com>> a
> >         écrit :____
> >
> >             Hi Pascal,
> >
> >             Thanks for the pointer to the draft.
> >
> >             Since I am surveying implementations for the update of RFC
> >             7925 (see
> >
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile/)
> >             I was wondering whether there is an implementation of this
> >             approach.
> >
> >             Ciao
> >             Hannes
> >
> >
> >             From: Pascal Urien <pascal.ur...@gmail.com
> >             <mailto:pascal.ur...@gmail.com>>
> >             Sent: Monday, September 21, 2020 11:44 AM
> >             To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@arm.com
> >             <mailto:hannes.tschofe...@arm.com>>
> >             Cc: Filippo Valsorda <fili...@ml.filippo.io
> >             <mailto:fili...@ml.filippo.io>>; tls@ietf.org
> >             <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
> >             Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
> >
> >             Hi All
> >
> >             Here is an example of PSK+ECDHE for IoT
> >
> >             https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00  uses
> >             TLS1.3 server  PSK+ECDHE for secure elements
> >
> >             The security level in these devices is as high as EAL5+
> >
> >             The computing time is about 1.4s for a PSK+ECDHE session
> >             (AES-128-CCM, + secp256r1)
> >
> >             The real critical resource is the required RAM size, less
> >             than 1KB in our experiments
> >
> >             The secure element  only needs a classical TCP/IP interface
> >             (i.e. sockets like)
> >
> >             Trusted PSK should avoid selfie attacks
> >
> >             Pascal
> >
> >
> >
> >             Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 11:29, Hannes Tschofenig
> >             <mailto:hannes.tschofe...@arm.com
> >             <mailto:hannes.tschofe...@arm.com>> a écrit :
> >             Hi Filippo,
> >
> >             • Indeed, if the SCADA industry has a particular need, they
> >             should profile TLS for use in that industry, and not require
> >             we change the recommendation for the open Internet.
> >
> >             We have an IoT profile for TLS and it talks about the use of
> >             PSK, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7925
> >
> >             On the “open Internet” (probably referring to the Web usage)
> >             you are not going to use PSKs in TLS. There is a separate
> >             RFC that provides recommendations for that environmnent, see
> >             RFC 752. That RFC is currently being revised, see
> >
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis/
> >
> >             Ciao
> >             Hannes
> >
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