The ServerHello ECH extension approach has lots of good properties, but also one big risk. What if a server decides that ECH is not needed for this connection, and does not send the extension at all? The connection will work just fine, because for the client absence of the extension implies "using the outer CH". Implementation laziness could easily lead to a state in which only the ECH-using connections use the ECH extensions in the Server Hello. That would fail both (1) and (2).
-- Christian Huitema On 9/12/2020 9:59 AM, Karthik Bhargavan wrote: >> Karthik: That approach works, but unless the ECH echo is universally >> deployed, it still reveals to a passive observer whether the server >> is ECH-enabled. That means, at least for several years, exchanges >> that are using ECH will likely "stick out" to a passive observer. >> This is something we are trying to avoid. > > I would like to return to this point, after some discussion with Chris > Wood, who points out that anybody can query a server to see if it > supports ECH. > > So, hiding whether a server supports ECH or not (which I called level > 2) is a significantly higher bar than hiding whether a particular > connection is using ECH or not (level 1). > I would like to understand how the WG feels about this requirement and > that there is consensus that we need (2) and not just (1). > > If we only need (1) then using a ServerHello ECH extension feels more > principled to me. > Of course, the ServerHello.random trick should work for both, but at > the cost of implementation complexity. > > -Karthik > >> >> On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 10:00 AM Karthik Bhargavan >> <karthikeyan.bharga...@inria.fr >> <mailto:karthikeyan.bharga...@inria.fr>> wrote: >> >> Perhaps I am misunderstanding the design constraints and the >> following idea >> has been thought of and discarded, but could we not remove trial >> decryption >> and replace it with a trial HMAC, at the cost of adding yet more >> crypto. >> >> - The outer ClientHello contains an ECH extension as usual. >> - The ServerHello ALWAYS echoes the ECH extension, whether it >> chooses the inner or outer ClientHello. >> - This ServerHello extension contains an HMAC of (say) an empty >> bytestring (or the current transcript) >> with a key derived from the chosen handshake secret (i.e. >> either using the innerCH or outerCH), >> - On receiving the ServerHello, the client generates both >> possible handshake secrets and both >> possible HMAC keys, verifies the HMAC and uses it to choose the >> correct handshake secret. >> >> Does the above still conflict with QUIC and open up active MitM >> attacks? >> >> Best, >> Karthik >> >> > On 8 Sep 2020, at 17:19, Christian Huitema <huit...@huitema.net >> <mailto:huit...@huitema.net>> wrote: >> > >> > The ECH proposal for Encrypted SNI is almost ready, but for a >> very small >> > debate. The original proposal was using trial description to >> distinguish >> > between ECH aware responses to the encrypted inner Client-Hello >> from non >> > ECH aware response to the "cover" outer CH. This is problematic >> in the >> > QUIC use case. The latest proposal is to embed a "hint" in 8 >> bytes of >> > the Server Random. The proposal was for ECH-aware servers to >> use eight >> > bytes of a hash of the inner Client Random as a hint. Analysis >> shows >> > that this enables two attacks: >> > >> > 1) If the Client Hello is replayed, the same hint will be >> present in the >> > response to the original CH and to the response to the copy, >> providing >> > observers with a clear indication that ECH was used. >> > >> > 2) If the Client Hello is intercepted by an MITM attacker, the >> attacker >> > can rewrite the server's response before presenting it to the >> client. >> > The attacker formats its own Server Hello that reuses the >> Server Random >> > from the original server response, but use its own key share, >> etc. The >> > hint will cause the ECH aware client to create an handshake key >> using >> > the inner CH. In a QUIC set up, the MITM attacker can easily detect >> > that, before even transmitting the server's certificate. Thus, >> the MITM >> > attacker can detect usage of ECH. >> > >> > We have a simple proposal that solves the replay attack: set >> the hint as >> > a hash of both the inner Client Random and the "non-hint" bytes >> of the >> > Server Random. That's clearly a good idea, but it does not >> solve the >> > active MITM attack. Solving that requires tying the hint with the >> > handshake key derived by the original server, for example by >> hashing the >> > inner Client Random, the "non-hint" bytes of the Server Random, >> and the >> > server key share. That's harder to implement, so the question >> is about >> > cost and opportunity. >> > >> > This all relates to how much ECH is "sticking out". The current >> stance >> > is that a passive attacker cannot distinguish between a client >> using ECH >> > to access a hidden SNI and a client merely greasing the ECH >> extension. >> > The observation is that there may be many potential active attacks, >> > especially if the server shares its ESNI/ECH configuration >> publicly. If >> > there are many such attacks, and if defense of the hint against >> MITM is >> > hard to implement, implementing the defense might make the code >> more >> > fragile, with little actual gain. But I am not convinced by that >> > argument, because it smells a lot like "the other side of the >> boat is >> > leaking too, why should I plug this particular leak?" >> > >> > And so, at Chris Wood's request, I am sending this message to >> the list. >> > >> > -- Christian Huitema >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > TLS mailing list >> > TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org> >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> >
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
