>
> If we can establish how difficult it would be to hash the server keyshare
> into the hint in various implementations, I think we'll have our answer.  I
> suspect it is difficult enough to create a problem for someone, but I'm not
> a TLS implementer.
>

One data point: In the standard Go implementation, the ServerHello.random
is computed well before the "key_shares" extension is serialized [1].
Changing this would be somewhat invasive, but perhaps not prohibitively
so.

Best,
Chris P.

[1]
https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/handshake_server_tls13.go#L83
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