The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246,
"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".

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You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6244

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Type: Editorial
Reported by: Victor S. Osipov <voip.i...@gmail.com>

Section: 6.2.3.2

Original Text
-------------
IV
The Initialization Vector (IV) SHOULD be chosen at random, and
MUST be unpredictable. Note that in versions of TLS prior to 1.1,
there was no IV field, and the last ciphertext block of the
previous record (the "CBC residue") was used as the IV. This was
changed to prevent the attacks described in [CBCATT]. For block
ciphers, the IV length is of length
SecurityParameters.record_iv_length, which is equal to the
SecurityParameters.block_size.

Corrected Text
--------------
IV
The Initialization Vector (IV) SHOULD be chosen at random, and
MUST be unpredictable. Note that in versions of TLS prior to 1.1,
there was no IV field, and the last ciphertext block of the
previous record (the "CBC residue") was used as the IV. This was
changed to prevent the attacks described in [CBCATT]. For block
ciphers, the IV length is of length
SecurityParameters.record_iv_length, which is equal to the
SecurityParameters.block_length.

Notes
-----
This is an error here. The structure SecurityParameters hasn't the element 
block_size.
It has the element block_length.
See in section 6.1:
struct {
ConnectionEnd entity;
PRFAlgorithm prf_algorithm;
BulkCipherAlgorithm bulk_cipher_algorithm;
CipherType cipher_type;
uint8 enc_key_length;
uint8 block_length;
uint8 fixed_iv_length;
uint8 record_iv_length;
MACAlgorithm mac_algorithm;
uint8 mac_length;
uint8 mac_key_length;
CompressionMethod compression_algorithm;
opaque master_secret[48];
opaque client_random[32];
opaque server_random[32];
} SecurityParameters;

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-------------
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RFC5246 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10)
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Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
Publication Date    : August 2008
Author(s)           : T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Transport Layer Security
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

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