I'm OK with adoption. That said, I believe that this falls a long way short of addressing the attacks that I'm aware of. But that assumes we share an understanding about what those attacks are. To begin with, we probably need a clearer description of goals.
To give an idea, address validation in QUIC is much more complex than is proposed here, for reasons I believe to be good. If this document does less than QUIC, it needs to justify that. On Thu, Jul 23, 2020, at 04:55, Sean Turner wrote: > Hi! > > The authors of "Return Routability Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3" > have asked for adoption of their draft as a WG item. Please state > whether you support adoption of this draft as a WG item by posting a > message to the TLS list by 2359 UTC 06 August 2020. Please include any > additional information that is helpful in understanding your position. > > NOTE: > We discussed this draft at IETF 105 in connection with > draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id [0]. The plan at the time was to > progress draft-tschofenig-tls-dtls-rrc after we progressed > draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id. That time is now. > > Thanks, > Chris, Joe, and Sean > > [0] > https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-105-tls-sessb-cid-00 > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
