+1 From: TLS <tls-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Bret Jordan Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2019 5:52 PM To: Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com> Cc: Tony Arcieri <basc...@gmail.com>; tls@ietf.org Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Impact on Network Security draft updated
ALERT This email was sent from a source external to BCBSM/BCN. DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you recognize the sender and trust the content. Thanks Sean. It is critical that we understand and discuss all sides of an issue and address all use cases that market has. Beating people down and trying to attack people or their use cases is not something we should be doing in formal standards, especially here at the IETF. Thanks, Bret PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg." On Jul 23, 2019, at 4:51 PM, Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com<mailto:s...@sn3rd.com>> wrote: Tony, While you may have concerns or otherwise disagree with the contents of this draft, let’s please keep discussion on this list, on all issues, polite and professional. spt (as co-chair) On Jul 23, 2019, at 16:05, Tony Arcieri <basc...@gmail.com<mailto:basc...@gmail.com>> wrote: On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 6:51 AM Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing) <ncamw...@cisco..com<mailto:ncamw...@cisco..com>> wrote: Hi, Thanks to all the feedback provided, we have updated the https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-camwinget-tls-use-cases-04 draft. At this point, we believe the draft is stable and would like to request its publication as an informational draft. I read this draft as the latest attempt in a disinformation campaign by manufacturers and users of middleboxes that passively decrypt TLS connections to politicize and reframe the argument around what is, at its core, a fundamentally insecure practice which is incompatible with technically sound and highly desirable protocol improvements to TLS. I implore you stop using overly broad terminology, euphemisms, weasel words, and other deceptive language to argue your points. This draft is titled "TLS 1.3 Impact on Network-Based Security", but the subtext is quite clearly the much narrower subfield of middlebox TLS decryption. By using such a grandiose title which is deceptively hiding the true subject matter, you are implying that middleboxes are the sum total of network security. The draft begins "Enterprises [...] need to defend their information systems from attacks originating from both inside and outside their networks." I am co-owner of a company which heavily leverages firewalls for layer 3/4 network security in conjunction with TLS. We care deeply about network security, and believe that our network is *more secure* specifically because we *don't* perform middlebox interception of TLS. I consider our company to be in the category of enterprise TLS users, and as an enterprise TLS user who cares deeply about network security, I do not identify whatsoever with the claims this draft is making about the needs of enterprise TLS users as a whole. In as much as what it describes to "network security", it is but one niche consideration within a vastly broader field, and one which is increasingly controversial. I will point out, since you appear to work at Cisco, that your company works on approaches to network security (e.g. malware detection) which avoid decrypting TLS: https://blogs.cisco.com/security/detecting-encrypted-malware-traffic-without-decryption There is an entire world of network IDS systems beyond middleboxes which passively decrypt TLS. It is factually inaccurate for this draft to be described as "TLS 1.3 Impact on Network-Based Security". If you are going to write a draft about the impact of TLS 1.3 on middleboxes for passive TLS decryption, please call a spade a spade and don't try to hide your true intentions under a bunch of weasel words and overly broad claims that make it sound like middlebox-related TLS decryption problems are the end of network security as we know it. My 2c, on behalf of non-middlebox-using enterprise TLS users who feel that attempts by middlebox-using enterprise TLS users to weaken TLS in order to retain compatibility with their traffic decryption appliances is a threat to the security of our enterprise TLS deployments. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls The information contained in this communication is highly confidential and is intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communication is directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this information is prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or telephone, of any unintended receipt and delete the original message without making any copies. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association.
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
