On 25/11/2018 17:18, Nick Lamb wrote: > In section 7.1 the -02 draft says: > > Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a defense > against this form of attack, but DoH/DPRIVE are also defenses against > DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a common case > where SNI. > > Where SNI what?
I'm guessing what's missing is an argument that DoT or DoH can (if better than opportunistic) counter some local attacks that'd be similarly mitigated by DNSSEC. > I'd be tempted to just say that yes, an active adversary can force you > to choose between privacy and connectivity, and hard fail DNSSEC is the > only existing way to choose privacy. Perhaps (exceptionally) less so in this case. The client here depends on confidentiality of the DNS query for both the A/AAAA and ESNIKeys RR's, so an authenticated DoT or DoH connection to a chosen recursive could be a pretty good defence here. And DNSSEC alone (hard fail or not) isn't sufficient. > The current text feels more like an attempt by people who don't want to > face the Dancing Pig problem to justify why their latest seat-belt that > snaps in a crash (to borrow Adam Langley's phrase) is a good idea > anyway. But regardless of whether I'm correct about that, the sentence > is confusing as it stands now. FWIW, I'd have no issue with more strongly encouraging DNSSEC, but I think ESNI turns out to be a situation where the presence or absence of DNSSEC perhaps makes less difference that in other TLS cases. For example, I think there's a stronger argument for DNSSEC being used to secure CAA RRs or those used by any ACME challenges, than there is for reasons related to ESNI. Cheers, S. > > Nick. > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
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