Hiya,

I've started to try code up an openssl version of this. [1]
(Don't be scared though, it'll likely be taken over by a
student in the new year:-)

From doing that I think the ESNIKeys structure is too
complicated and could do with a bunch of changes. The ones
I'd argue for would be:

- use a new RR, not TXT
- have values of ESNIKey each only encode a single option
  (so no lists at all) since >1 value needs to be supported
  at the DNS level anyway
   - that'd mean exactly one ciphersuite
   - exactly one key share
   - no extensions (make an even newer RR or version-bump:-)
- get rid of not_before/not_after - I don't believe those
  are useful given TTLs and they'll just lead to failures
- get rid of padded_length - just say everyone must
  always use the max (260?) - that needs to be the same
  for all encrypted sni values anyway so depending on
  'em all to co-ordinate the same value in DNS seems
  fragile
- I'm not convinced the checksum is useful, but it's not
  hard to handle
- (Possibly) drop the base64 encoding, make it DNS operator
  friendly text (or else binary with a zonefile text format
  defined in addition)

I'm fine that such changes don't get done for a while (so
I or my student get time to try make stuff work:-) and
it might in any case take a while to figure out how to
handle the multi-CDN use-case discussed in Bangkok which
would I guess also affect this structure some, but I wanted
to send this to the list while it's fresh for me.

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/master/esnistuff

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