Sent from my mobile device
> On Jul 4, 2018, at 2:20 PM, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote: > > Hi Kathleen, > >> On Wed, Jul 4, 2018 at 11:10 AM, Kathleen Moriarty >> <kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> wrote: >> I’m also fine with the work going forward, however it was only in March that >> EKR assured people concerned that they don’t need to worry about SNI being >> encrypted repeating similar statements previously made to the same effect. >> Meantime, he was working on such a solution. > > This is not really correct. As of March, I had basically given up on how to > do ESNI in TLS the near future and wasn't really working on it [0] and then > in May, prompted by suggestions by Matthew Prince and Nick Sullivan, I > realized that the proposal in this document could work. > > Moreover, I think I've been pretty clear that I wanted to do ESNI and it was > just that we didn't know how. For instance, here's what I said in PATIENT: > > My evaluation of the current state of SNI encryption is that given the > current technical state, it will not see particularly wide deployment, with > the primary scenario being "at-risk" sites who are subject to censorship > who > either hide behind or co-tenant with sites which are not subject to > censorship. That probably isn't going to be incredibly common right now.. > Of > course, this is regrettable from the perspective of people designing these > protocols, but I think that's the situation. > > As I said the other day, predictions are hard, especially about the future, > and this turns out not to have been totally right (though I also don't think > it's really accurate to characterize it as my saying that people don't need > to worry). I'm sorry if people people are surprised now. That wasn't my > intent, but as I said above, I was surprised too! > Well, the messages on the Effects of Pervasive Encryption for Operators also factored into my response. You wanted that text removed and we refused (rightly so). You also had someone write a blog to have a reference that talked about it’s wide deployment. The perception is from multiple interactions and I favor transparency. Best, Kathleen > -Ekr > > [0] Just to be completely clear, there was and is ongoing work on protecting > SNI via HTTP connection coalescence (see Mike Bishop's presentation in > London), but that's a different flavor of approach, and it's not like it's > any secret it's happening. > > > >> Kathleen >> >> > >> > Cheers, >> > S. >> > >> > >> >> >> >> -Ekr >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> TLS mailing list >> >> TLS@ietf.org >> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> >> >> > <0x5AB2FAF17B172BEA.asc> >> > _______________________________________________ >> > TLS mailing list >> > TLS@ietf.org >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
