Hi Tony, Thanks for forwarding these.
I haven't had time to give them a thorough review, but on a quick skim I notice that this seems to be based on TLS 1.2 and to use a bunch of algorithms we are trying to deprecate (e.g., CBC). Is there a reason not to start with TLS 1.3 and more modern algorithms? -Ekr On Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 8:07 AM, Tony Rutkowski < trutkowski.netma...@gmail.com> wrote: > As everyone is aware, the decision was taken > within the IETF TLS community not to undertake > work perceived to compromise TLS 1.3 and related > protocols. At the same time, there has been > recognition that a considerable number of use > cases exist where alternative transport, network > and application layer implementations are > necessary in both network infrastructures and data > centres. > > The work on those alternative implementations has > proceeded over a two year period in ETSI's Cyber > Security Technical Committee (TC CYBER). In the > spirit of some level of collaboration between ETSI > and the IETF community, as well as public > transparency, CYBER is making available two draft > parts of a Technical Specification called the > Middlebox Security Protocol. The motivation is to > address one of the most difficult security > challenges today: how to enable network operators > and end-users to cooperate in managing encryption > security for their applications. The drafts are > available at: > > https://docbox.etsi.org/CYBER/CYBER/Open/Latest_Drafts > > Note that there are two problems being pursued > here. The Middlebox Security Protocol enables the > existence of a “smart proxy” where end-users can > be potentially aware of a middlebox in their > traffic stream (visibility) and control what that > middlebox sees for different purposes > (observability). The result allows for balancing > privacy, network operations, and security for > different applications. With the Protocol, both > users and providers gain the ability to grant or > restrict the permissions for visibility and > observability. > > Part 1 of the Middlebox Security Protocol > specification defines the generic capabilities and > security requirements. Additional parts define > specific implementations in the form of profiles > for different use cases that can be mapped to the > Part 1 requirements. > > Part 2 provides a common profile for widespread > network use known in the research community as > mcTLS. Included with Part 2 are a patch for a > known vulnerability as well as an exemplar of use > by Mobile Network Operators. Other profiles will > be released over the coming months – especially > one for data centre access control to meet the > critical needs of enterprise network communities. > > These initial two draft specifications are > relatively complete and stable, and derived from > best-of-breed solutions drawn from extensive > surveys and evaluation of the considerable > published technical literature. However, this > work is new, complex, and unique. > > In addition, TC CYBER is proactively sending the > drafts to other industry standards bodies as well > as holding a Hot Middlebox Workshop (12 June 2018) > and Hackathon (12-13 June 2018), in Sophia-Antipolis > France, where the coding community can seek to > implement and hack a test implementation of Part 2. > It is all open, and free. > > In addition to collaboration and comments on this list, > comments are also solicited at cybersupp...@etsi.org > > --tony r > > >
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