On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 12:48 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <bka...@akamai.com> wrote: [...]
> I concede that it remains useful to consider what the client will do > with the received DANE records or denial thereof, so as to not unduly > block off future routes for development. But it seems at least possible > to take > a very broad view in this space, including even the possibility of > additional > TLS extensions that can modify the behavior of this one (such as a > modification > to provide pinning-like behavior). Maybe that's the best option. Advance the current document as-is. And also develop a separate DANE pinning extension (now'ish ..) -- Shumon Huque
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