> On Apr 5, 2018, at 10:54 AM, Nico Williams <n...@cryptonector.com> wrote:
>
> We could mitigate the DoS by saying that the pin TTL must be coerced to
> zero (or maybe 1) if the extension only bore an authenticated denial of
> existence. I would prefer to not have to do this, but I'd accept it.
When we get past this consensus call, and get to craft the actual text
describing the pin TTL, I would expect a non-zero PIN to only be possible
when proving TLSA records. A denial of existence should not be able to
set a new pin TTL, and should clear any previous pin TTL. If DANE is not
actually deployed, there's little reason to pin the extension, and clearing
the pin via denial of existence is a useful mechanism.
A client might then lose access to continued denial of existence until
it again sees actual TLSA records with a non-zero pin, but that seems
OK to me.
--
Viktor.
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