On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-d...@dukhovni.org> wrote:
> > > > On Apr 4, 2018, at 10:07 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thom...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > Given what we've learned about pinning (it is being removed from > > browsers), this seems like a bad plan to me. > > Question, are you thinking of HPKP or STS? HPKP pins rather volatile > data, and is too fragile to be used (something I would have predicted > without even running the experiment). STS and this proposal pin a > capability: > > * STS: I can be relied on to support TLS > * option (B): I can be relied on to support the TLS extension > for the specified itme (or not when the TTL is 0). > I don't think that this comparison is particularly apt.The representation in HSTS is simply "I support HSTS". The representation in HPKP is "I will use either consistent keying material *or* a consistent set of CAs". The representation here is "I will continue to have DNSSEC-signed DANE records". That is a significantly more risky proposition than continuing to support TLS (and I'm ignoring the risk of hijacking attacks that people were concerned with with HPKP), and so this seems rather more like HPKP to me. -Ekr > -- > Viktor. > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
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