A similar idea was proposed a while back, albeit with simpler semantics: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lemon-tls-blocking-alert-00
Discussion here: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg20264.html I'm not really enthusiastic about any of these ideas for any of the administratively prohibited use cases because the information being provided to the user is unverifiable. I.e., this just tells you that someone on the network didn't like it, but the message itself is just an assertion (this is different from 451 in that that's provided inside the TLS channel if TLS is used). It's not like, for instance, the browser should display the string to the user as if it were true. The captive portal case seems a bit more plausible, in that it can be machine processed by the client to do some sort of captive portal detection thingy (e.g., connect to a site over HTTP). However, the right place to bring this kind of proposal would probably be CAPPORT (https://tools.ietf.org/wg/capport/). However, I see that they are pursuing a different direction based on HTTP. -Ekr On Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 11:15 AM, Mateusz Jończyk <mat.jonc...@o2.pl> wrote: > Hello, > OpenDNS by default blocks websites that are used for phishing and > optionally > other sites as configured by the deployer. It does this by DNS poisoning: > it > responds with a forged A or AAAA response that redirects to their server. > An > example website blocked by OpenDNS in this manner is > https://internetbadguys.com/. > > When OpenDNS blocks a website that is served by HTTPS, the user is > presented > with a "Certificate Error" message. To see what happened, she then has to > accept > the incorrect certificate or visit the plain HTTP version of the webpage. > This > creates some problems: aside from a bad user experience, it makes users > accustomed to ignoring certificate errors. > > Another problem is created by captive portals: networks that use "a web > page > which is displayed to newly connected users before they are granted broader > access to network resources." (Wikipedia). > > This could be solved by specifying two new values of AlertDescription: > access_administratively_disabled and captive_portal as well as a new > field to > struct Alert: alert_message. > > Let alert_message be a fixed-length UTF-8-encoded string. It would be only > valid > for > (description == access_administratively_disabled > || > description == captive_portal) > and otherwise a client would HAVE TO ignore it. It would be plain-text for > simplicity, shortness and security. It would be null-terminated and then > randomly padded to a size of perhaps 100 bytes. A TLS client would HAVE TO > filter the message for any odd characters, invalid UTF-8 sequences, etc. > as will > be specified in the standard. > > Greetings, > Mateusz Jończyk > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
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