On Sat, Dec 16, 2017 at 12:30:06AM +0100, Martin Rex wrote: > Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusva...@welho.com> wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 07:33:44PM +0000, Tim Hollebeek wrote: > >> > >> However, servers are easier to upgrade than clients, which is why you see > >> some of the server side support you mention. I know CloudFlare in > >> particular helped a lot of people cope with communicating with clients who > >> had different certificate capabilities. It isn't a bad thing that both > >> approaches exist. > > > > Also, it should be noted that the past two migrations needed to be > > compatible with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, which have much less advanced > > signature negotiation than TLS 1.2 (and 1.3). > > There is an awfully large installed base of borked TLSv1.2 servers. > > If those servers are equipped with a sha256WithRsaEncryption server cert, > the handshake results are: > > - TLSv1.0 for SSLv3 ClientHello w/ client_version = (3,1) > - TLSv1.1 for SSLv3 ClientHello w/ client_version = (3,2) > - TLSv1.1 for SSL VERSION 2 CLIENT-HELLO offering (3,3) > - chokes and drops network connection > for SSLv3 ClientHello w/ client_version = (3,3) > > i.e. there exists a serious interop problem for TLSv1.2 with such servers, > but there is no problem interoperating with TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1
What I meant is that in TLS 1.2, one could signal the client transition status, whereas that is not possible in TLS 1.0 and 1.1. E.g. suppose we need to transition from SHA-2 to SHA-3. Pre-transition: signature_algorithms=...,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,... In-transition: signature_algorithms=...,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha3256,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,... Post-transition: signature_algorithms=...,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha3256,... And server with apropriate SHA-3 certificate chain can send it to the client. The similar works across signature algorithms. But this is not possible with TLS 1.0 and 1.1 without very nasty hacks. However, as noted, many servers do not correctly deal with having two certificates at the same time. Or server owners think it is too difficult to deal with them. Dual-signature certificates would be valuable for those cases. -Ilari _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
