On Fri, Aug 18, 2017 at 3:46 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <d...@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> While i think i understand where you're coming from, Tony, i can't help > but note that this use case is difficult to distinguish from a regime > that: > > (a) wants to forbid anonymous speech, and > > (b) wants to censor "unapproved" information sources, and > > (c) wants the capacity to undermine freedom of association. > > That makes me wary, and i hope that SNI Encryption is *not* conflated > with these particular use cases. > TLS tunnels have a multitude of use cases, from SNI encryption to service discovery-aware load balancers to Tor-like anonymity networks to privacy-preserving payment channel networks to my much more mundane "Squid-like authenticated egress proxy" problem. I'm simply asking that if tunnels become the mechanism by which SNI encryption is ultimately implemented, that all of the potential use cases of tunnels are considered, rather than observing the problem through the microcosm that is "SNI Encryption". Note that I'm proposing absolutely nothing new, just asking that the tunneling problem be considered from more angles than one. If TLS contains (mis)features which forbid anonymous speech or censor unapproved information sources, I'm afraid that the ship has already sailed there. But perhaps, well-implemented TLS tunnels could ultimately help route around censorship. -- Tony Arcieri
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